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ABSTRACT 
 
JENNIFER GARDELLA:  Europe’s Failure to Harmonize: A Qualitative Exploration of the 
Factors Contributing to the Impotence of the Common European Asylum System  
(Under the direction of Donald Searing) 
 
Despite the completion of two phases spanning nearly fourteen years, the Common European 
Asylum System (CEAS) has yet to result in a real, tangible, and widespread improvement of 
the outcomes for asylum seekers who petition for protective status in the European Union 
(EU).  Efforts to harmonize the national asylum policies of the individual EU Member States 
along a uniform set of basic, minimum standards of protection have stalled, and asylum 
seekers continue to be denied the protection guaranteed to them under international 
humanitarian law. This paper explores the reasons for this failure to harmonize and points to 
several national and supranational context factors – both domestic and external – that are 
convalescing in such a way to render the CEAS rather impotent, ultimately demonstrating 
that the overall quality of care and protection offered to asylum seekers in Europe still leaves 
much to be desired and requires immediate attention. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Following the aftermath of the Second World War, at the 1951 United Nations Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees in Geneva, representatives from twenty-four nations 
unanimously ratified an international agreement reiterating the right to seek asylum from 
persecution for those who required protection as a result of events occurring specifically 
before 1 January 1951.  A 1967 Protocol broadened the scope of the original convention by 
effectively removing the temporal and geographic constraints. 
As changes in migrant flows emerged over the past several decades since the 
Convention, the European Union (EU) and its Member States have adjusted policy 
orientations accordingly to manage these influxes in petitions for protection.  Many of these 
early policies at the national level were overtly deterrent in nature, indicating a primacy 
placed on border control and security rather than on humanitarian concerns. The EU 
Commission, in recognition of disharmony among the national asylum systems (in terms of 
quality, efficiency, and burden) and in response to further changes in migration patterns, 
sought to install a common asylum scheme to overcome disparities in the sovereign asylum 
regimes of its Member States.  The move towards establishing a European-wide standard for 
asylum policy, initiated by the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999 in the form of the Common 
European Asylum System (CEAS), signaled a welcomed shift in the rhetoric, away from the 
antagonistic policies of the early nineties and toward a policy configuration more in line with 
Europe’s traditional orientation towards the protection of human rights.  
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Now, more than sixty years after the entry into force of the 1951 Convention and over 
a decade since the initial mandate of the CEAS, people seeking asylum in the EU are still not 
being uniformly afforded their rights to protection.  Asylum seekers continue to receive and 
experience differential treatment depending on which Member State handles their claim to 
protection despite the implementation of the CEAS, indicating that the efforts to harmonize 
asylum policy have yet to result in a real, tangible, and widespread improvement of the 
outcomes for people who petition for protective status in the EU.  Why is the treatment of 
asylum seekers so varied across the Member States of a political union that claims to adhere 
to a basic and uniform set of minimum standards of protection?  This paper aims to explore 
some of the contextual factors, both domestic and external, that contribute to the persistent 
differences in treatment of asylum seekers across the EU. 
BACKGROUND 
I.  Post-Geneva: A Brief History of Asylum Policy in the EU 
The late 1980s saw a significant increase in the number of people seeking asylum in Europe, 
particularly from Central and Eastern Europe, prompting European-level discussion 
regarding management of asylum applications and migration flows.  Several policy 
developments stand out as particularly restrictive, but it is fair to say that the overall 
sentiment of national governments across the continent was one of concern with the 
increasing number of cases, and that an implicit policy goal of this era was to reduce the 
number of asylum applications and positive recognitions – even if these goals were met at the 
expense of human rights. 
One strategy enacted by most Member States to reduce the magnitude of annual 
asylum applications in Europe is known as the ‘safe country of origin’ rule.  Introduced in 
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1990, the strategy allows national asylum systems to streamline their procedural burdens and 
relieve pressure by issuing a ‘safe status’ to certain countries that meet select criteria, 
including human rights record, government stability, and the presence of genuine democratic 
institutions. (Martenson and McCarthy, 1998) Though it originally intended to serve as a 
screening process to reduce application backlogs, utilization of ‘safe country of origin’ 
practices effectively allows these national asylum systems to place a generalized label of 
‘safe’ on particular countries and determine all subsequent asylum applications to be either 
unserious or even disingenuous.  A similar policy can be viewed as an extension of the ‘safe 
country of origin’ concept to countries of transit, which allows for the rejection of asylum 
seekers who pass through a ‘third’ country that is considered by the EU as safe. (Martenson 
and McCarthy, 1998) This return is predicated on the assumption that the claim to asylum 
will be fully investigated by this safe transit country, and that the asylum seeker’s 
fundamental rights will be respected during processing time.   
During the same period of policy development, European countries introduced 
additional measures that can only be viewed as having the aim of discouraging asylum 
applications from being lodged in their particular states.  These policies took on two 
orientations: prevention and deterrence. (Bocker and Havinga, 1998) Prevention policies 
included stringent visa requirements and pre-flight checks originating in certain refugee-
producing countries, which were both aimed at preventing asylum seekers from ever 
reaching Europe.  Deterrence policies were enacted to make the asylum environment in a 
particular country less appealing for potential applicants and included measures that 
facilitated rejection of applications, limited options for appeal and free movement, and 
reduced access to social assistance.   
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II.  The CEAS: Efforts to Harmonize Asylum Policy at the EU Level 
The crisis in Kosovo and the subsequent influx of petitions for protection received in the EU 
redirected attention once again to the asylum issue in the late nineties.  After 1998, EU 
Member States were faced with the reality that their asylum policy structures were ill 
equipped to manage the more than half million people that fled the Balkans.  (Nickels, 2007) 
In order to address both the lack of harmonization of national asylum policies and the 
absence of true oversight by authorities at the supranational level, the EU began the 
development of a Common European Asylum System under the mandate of the Treaty of 
Amsterdam, which entered into force in 1999.  The overarching goal of the first phase was 
the harmonization of national asylum policies via the establishment of basic minimum 
standards and protocols.  The second phase, beginning in 2005 and originally projected to 
continue through 2012, focuses on the development of practical mechanisms for further and 
more efficient harmonization of policies and procedures in order to create a truly functional 
CEAS. 
The First Phase: 1999-2005 
In its Policy Plan on Asylum (2008), the Commission identifies four primary legislative 
developments that occurred during this first phase of establishing the CEAS.   The directive 
on reception conditions for asylum seekers refers to the comparability of reception 
protocols across Member States and mandates that all asylum seekers be informed of their 
rights, provided with basic necessities (accommodation, food, clothing, medical care) and 
given the right to access the labor market and the education system of the receiving country.  
The directive on qualifications emphasizes the essentiality of the Member States operating 
under the same definition and understanding of the criteria that justify granting protective 
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status to an applicant.  ("Policy plan on asylum," 2008) The directive on asylum procedures 
requires that Member States adhere to minimum safeguards for asylum applicants to 
guarantee fair and efficient treatment while still retaining national sovereignty.  ("Policy plan 
on asylum," 2008) 
 The fourth legislative measure identified by the Commission is the Dublin 
Regulation, which serves as a mechanism for one state to take responsibility for 
investigating an asylum claim, diminishing duplicate applications (termed asylum shopping) 
and increasing processing efficiency. ("Policy plan on asylum," 2008)  The assumption of the 
Dublin Regulation is that the initial country of entry will investigate an asylum claim; this 
state also has the obligation of taking back asylum applicants who move throughout the EU 
without proper permissive documentation.   
The Second Phase: 2005 – 2012 
Various evaluations conducted by the Commission on the quality of EU-wide application of 
the stipulations outlined in the directives showed very persistent disparities in reception 
conditions and asylum decision trends, even among Member States with comparable systems 
and similar caseloads.  In 2008, the Commission released a Policy Plan on Asylum intended 
to serve as a roadmap for the second phase of establishing the CEAS, with a projected 
completion date of the end of 2012.  The goals for this second phase were essentially 
reiterations of the goals outlined in the first phase.   
The Policy Plan proposed a three-pronged (or ‘pillared’) strategy in order to reach 
these target goals.  The first pillar – harmonization – acknowledged the need for even 
further alignment of national asylum policies and the creation of common minimum 
standards to truly cultivate a level playing field.  The second pillar – cooperation – declared 
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support for the establishment of a centralized European Asylum Support Office (EASO). 
("Policy plan on asylum," 2008)  The third pillar – responsibility and solidarity – focused on 
issues of responsible and unified action on the part of EU Member States and third-party 
countries.  The major policy change proposed in this third pillar is an amendment to the 
Dublin Regulation and called for a community mechanism to allow a suspension of the 
Dublin agreement if the reception conditions of the country of entry are not adequate to deal 
with high influxes of asylum seekers. 
Current Assessment of the Implementation of the CEAS 
According to the official rhetoric of the EU, the uniform protocols outlined above were 
intended not only to increase the efficiency of granting asylum in the EU but also to enhance 
the overall quality of protection and make Europe a real place of refuge for those who seek it.  
However, the Commission’s 2012 benchmark for the realization of these goals passed 
without a major harmonization of the capacities of the Member States to provide appropriate 
standards of protection for asylum seekers within their borders.  Though EU Commissioners 
and representatives from the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) have 
acknowledged that the EU has made positive strides with the CEAS in theory, the practical 
implementation of the policy scheme is still sorely lacking and disparities continue to persist.  
(European Policy Center, 2012)  
 Efforts by the EU to harmonize national asylum policies along minimum standards 
have not been particularly successful and significant variation across Member States 
regarding the treatment of asylum seekers endures, in spite of the existence of a policy 
regime intended to achieve these goals. (Pirjola, 2009)  This implies that the attempts to 
Europeanize asylum policy through the development and implementation of the CEAS have 
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been in some way sabotaged or blocked by various factors at play internally and externally, 
and within and across, national contexts.  This paper endeavors to explore some of these 
potential factors that contribute to the differential treatment of asylum seekers in a small 
selection of EU Member States. 
METHODOLOGY 
In furtherance of the exploration of the research question at hand, three EU Member States 
were selected for in-depth qualitative analysis in the form of within-country, theory-
generating case studies and subsequent cross-country comparisons.  In addition to presenting 
country profiles through descriptive narratives, various causal process mechanisms will be 
explored through process tracing – a procedure whose goal is to “identify processes linking a 
set of initial conditions to a particular outcome” – in order to shed light on any patterns 
observed.  (Vennesson, 2008; 224) 
I.  Definition of Key Concepts 
Who Qualifies for Protective Status? 
This is perhaps the easiest concept to define for this scholastic endeavor, as there is a sound 
legal basis for the definition in international human rights law.  When making reference to 
asylum seekers1 in the EU, this paper will adhere to the language put forth by the 1951 
United Nations Convention in Geneva, which ultimately resulted in the following definition: 
“A [refugee is any] person who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of 
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside 
the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of 
the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of 
his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is 
unwilling to return to it…”  (UN Convention and Protocol, 1951) 
 
                                                
1 The distinction between asylum seekers and refugees is primarily a geographic one; refugees petition for resettlement in 
EU Member States from outside EU borders, while asylum seekers make claims for protective status upon arrival to the 
Member State.  The same criteria regarding well-founded fear of persecution apply.   
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Underpinning this definition are several basic doctrines inherent to human rights law that are 
also essential to highlight before exploring the research question posed.  The principle of 
non-discrimination regardless of race, religion, political orientation, country of origin and the 
like are self evident in the criteria outlined above; subsequent developments in international 
law have required that the non-discrimination principle be applied to cases of persecution due 
to sex, gender, age, disability and sexuality.  
Additionally, the Convention identifies the principle of non-refoulement as 
fundamental to the assurance of protection.  Non-refoulement refers to the prohibition of 
returning an individual “in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life 
or freedom would be threatened” on account of any quality or trait defined within the non-
discrimination criteria. (UN Convention, 1951)  This stipulation places the onus on the 
receiving nation to ensure that no asylum-seeker is penalized for illegal entry, as they must 
frequently break immigration law in order to make their asylum claims, and to properly 
investigate all claims to international protection before any action towards deportation is 
taken.  
Defining the “Treatment” Variable 
The treatment of refugees refers generally to the ways in which refugees and asylum seekers 
are managed upon arrival to the EU.  In order to examine how and why the treatment of 
asylum seekers and refugees varies across EU contexts, a more nuanced understanding of 
what exactly constitutes such treatment is of utmost importance.  In the following analysis, 
the most basic assessment of treatment will be presented in the form of simple raw, 
descriptive data on Convention status recognition rates2; high recognition rates imply that a 
                                                
2 UNHCR data on the number of positive Convention-status decisions as a percentage of total decisions for 2005 was not 
available for Spain, Germany, or Denmark. 
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national asylum system functions efficiently and places a primacy on the welfare of 
individuals seeking asylum, whereas low recognition rates might suggest any number of 
problems within a given Member State’s asylum scheme.  Additional modes of 
operationalization will include real application processing times, assessments of the reception 
conditions in detention and processing centers, access to interpreters and legal counsel, 
instances of refoulement, access to welfare and the labor market, and the nature of any direct 
interaction of government entities with asylum seekers (e.g. interactions and treatment at the 
border, within detention centers, during sea-arrivals, etc). 
II.  Identification of Independent Variables 
The purpose of this paper is to explore some of the factors that result in disparate treatment 
of asylum seekers in the EU; as such, the analysis to follow will pay particular attention to 
the following factors along which ‘treatment’ may vary: 
 
Figure 1.  List of Internal and External Factors under Examination 
Internal Factors External Factors 
Economic Conditions Economic Partnerships 
Ruling Party Ideologies Foreign Policy and Interests Abroad 
Geopolitics and Border Issues Colonial Ties 
Baseline Quality of National Asylum Systems EU statements, evaluations, and sanctions 
Domestic Public Opinion/Sentiment External Pressures (UN, NGOs, watch groups) 
 
III.  Case Selection 
The analysis of the treatment of asylum seekers and adherence to CEAS protocol for all 
twenty-seven EU Member States is beyond the scope of this project; consequently, the 
nations of Spain, Germany, and Denmark have been selected for close examination.  These 
cases were chosen due to their variance on the internal and external factors outlined in the 
above section, with the intention that this variance would lend some degree of 
representativeness of the EU asylum environment to this very small sample.  The description 
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and analysis of the treatment of asylum seekers in these three EU Member States will be 
limited to the period identified by the Commission as the second phase of the implementation 
of the CEAS: 2005 to 2012. 
IV.  Limitations 
As with any cross-case, comparative study in political science scholarship, there are of 
course many limitations to the following qualitative examinations.  Comprehensive and 
reliable data on migration issues generally is difficult to come by in the European context; 
quality data concerning the asylum issue – an arguably small niche within migration studies – 
is even more rare.  Beyond the raw numbers measuring recognition rates and petition 
processing times, it is difficult to find or create valid measurements for the treatment 
variable, which could mask real disparities or point to ones that are not actually there. 
 Additionally, the case studies will face the inherent problem of infinite causality 
during narrative building and process tracing; though the period under study has definitive 
temporal bounds, the causal mechanisms that might be uncovered during in-depth 
exploration of the individual cases can very likely be traced much farther back in time and 
perhaps conflate with one another, making it difficult to unpack the historical chain that led 
to the present national contexts. 
ANALYSIS OF CASES 
The following sections provide a detailed account of the treatment of asylum seekers in the 
selected countries, as well as a description of the political, economical, and social contexts in 
which the national asylum environments are couched.  
Spain 
I. Country Profile: 2005-2012 
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From 2004 through 2012, Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero of the Spanish 
Socialist Workers’ Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Español; PSOE) was the head of the 
Spanish government; for the period under study, Spain was under the control of a center-left, 
social democratic party.  Mariano Rajoy recently replaced him in December, initiating a 
political shift to the right with the entrance into power of the Popular Party (Partido Popular; 
PP).  It is, of course, too early to tell what kind of effect this change will have on the asylum 
issue in Spain. 
An immigration policy scheme was not incorporated into Spanish national law until 
1985, when the Ley de Extranjería (Law on the Rights and Freedoms of Foreigners in Spain) 
was enacted.  (Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, 2013) The relatively 
recent timing of the ratification of this law is likely due to Spain’s late transition to 
democracy after the end of the Franco regime, as well as the country’s entry into the 
European Community in 1986, which required that an immigration regulation framework be 
in place.  As such, the first migration and asylum reception centers in Spain were not 
constructed until 1987; in 2005, Spain’s twenty-four reception centers cumulatively offered 
space for only one thousand asylum seekers.  (van de Wetering, 2005) 
The most up-to-date asylum legislation mandates that petitions filed in Spain must 
undergo a preliminary evaluation to determine admissibility into the formal asylum 
determination procedure; all decisions must be rendered within sixty days of initial 
submission.  During this time, applicants must be provided with free access to legal counsel 
and interpreters.  If the petition is deemed admissible, the application moves into the formal 
asylum determination procedure and the person attached to the application is provided with 
an identification card and assigned to a reception center.  (van de Wetering, 2005) Asylum 
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seekers remain entitled to aid from legal counsel and interpreters, and they have access to 
basic social and medical care.  A decision on whether or not to grant protective status to a 
petitioner should be rendered within six months, but can be extended up to one year.  Options 
for accelerated processing are available for cases deemed to necessitate urgent action.  
Currently, Spain has no formal agreements stipulating annual quotas of positive asylum 
decisions or refugee resettlements. 
II.  Treatment of Asylum Seekers in Spain 
Regardless of its apparent draw as an entry point for migrants, during the period under study, 
Spain boasted one of the lowest asylum recognition rates in the entire EU.  (Amnesty 
International, 2010)  The recognition rates from 2006 through 2012 are presented below: 
Table 1. Recognition Rates in Spain 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Recognition Rate* 3.9% 4.4% 2.9% 3.8% 10.2% 9.8% 9.5% 
*Positive decisions granting UN Convention Status as a percentage of total decisions.  
Sources: UNCHR Statistical Yearbook, 2006-2011; Bitoulas, 2012; Eurostat, 2012. 
 
 
Despite the jump in positive decisions after 2009, as a very basic indicator, this trend of 
persistently and markedly low recognition rates (relative to the rates of other EU countries) 
provides some suggestion that the national asylum system is not functioning to capacity.  
Several other indicators suggest that the system is subpar and not meeting standards set forth 
by the CEAS, but these are best presented via illustrative descriptions of the nature of the 
operations and conduct of Spanish immigration, asylum, and border control officials, both at 
border points and at sea.   
Ceuta and Melilla: Seeking Asylum in the Spanish Enclaves 
The Spanish territories of Ceuta and Melilla on the African continent serve as concerning 
examples as to the quality of the functioning of the Spanish asylum system.  Asylum seekers 
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who find themselves in reception centers in the enclaves face unhygienic, overcrowded 
detention rooms, nutritionally poor and infrequent meals, brutality at the hands of guards, and 
little or no access to health care or legal aid.  (Amnesty International, 2006)  Asylum seekers 
are not regularly informed of their rights or the progression of their cases, and often are not 
provided with lawyers or qualified interpreters.   
Excessive use of force by border control authorities is a major point of concern for 
NGOs and humanitarian rights groups monitoring the situation in the enclaves.  In one 
incident, thirteen migrants were killed while attempting to cross the borders from Morocco 
into the enclaves over the course of several days in September and October of 2005.  Some of 
the migrants who were killed were fatally shot with live ammunition, while others died of 
injuries sustained from falling off the barbed border fences, which are “made of wires and 
stakes and when the migrants fall from a six-meter height [they] are torn to pieces.” 
(Amnesty International, 2006) Though this particular instance is notable for the high number 
of deaths over a span of only a few days, asylum seekers dying or suffering critical injuries 
during attempts to cross into the enclaves is not an uncommon occurrence.         
 Along a similar vein, expulsions perpetrated by the Spanish Guardia Civíl in 
conjunction with the Moroccan authorities are often unjust, unlawful, and accompanied by 
severe human rights abuses, making them another major source of concern.  In some cases, 
these deportations occur before an individual is granted the opportunity to claim asylum; in 
others, border control officials routinely tear up documents granted by the UNHCR 
indicating asylum-seeker status before formal admission into the determination process.  
These individuals are turned over to Moroccan authorities, who often abandon them in the 
desert near the Algerian border without food or water. (Amnesty International, 2006)  
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The Canary Islands: More of the Same 
Due to increasingly vigorous patrols in the Mediterranean during the 2000s, migration routes 
shifted and adjusted, and more asylum seekers found themselves undertaking the longer and 
arguably more treacherous journey from the West African Coast to the Canary Islands.  In 
2006, the number of migrants (over 31,200 – asylum seekers included) arriving to the 
Canaries by boat was nearly seven times higher than the previous year.  (Amnesty 
International, 2008) This sudden influx of arrivals to the Canary Islands placed an obvious 
strain on already insufficient reception and status determination procedures.  Regional 
authorities corralled all undocumented migrants – asylum seekers, unaccompanied minors, 
and members of vulnerable groups alike – into makeshift detention centers, where severe 
overcrowding exacerbated an already unsanitary, tense, and occasionally violent 
environment. (Amnesty International, 2008)  Once a petitioner has entered the formal asylum 
determination phase, processing and decision times at reception facilities in the Canaries 
average a staggering two to three years – a far cry from the six-month time frame given by 
the legislation on asylum; processing times are similar at reception centers in the enclaves as 
well as on the Spanish mainland. (van de Wetering, 2005) 
Spain and NATO: Inaction in the Mediterranean 
On 26 March 2011, a dinghy packed over capacity with 76 asylum seekers set sail out of 
Tripoli with hopes of reaching Lampedusa, Italy.  Shortly thereafter, the migrant boat fell 
under distress due to poor weather conditions and a lack of proper navigation equipment.  
The migrant boat was identified and located by the coast guards of several European 
countries and NATO operated vessels, but no actual attempts at rescue were made (Shenker, 
2012).  By 10 April, the boat had drifted back to Libya with only ten of the seventy-six 
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migrants still alive; those ten were promptly arrested and placed in a detention center by 
Gaddafi loyalists, where one later died.   
Following the incident, the Council of Europe launched a nine-month investigation to 
determine whether every appropriate action was taken to rescue the passengers of the vessel 
and – if not – where the responsibility lies.  The investigation identified the Spanish frigate 
Méndez Núñez as the particular vessel that had the highest capacity to assist but willfully 
ignored the opportunity to answer the distress calls and come to the aid of the migrant boat.  
Despite notification of and its proximity to the boat in distress (under eleven nautical miles 
away), the Méndez Núñez made no attempts at rescue.  In its report, the Council of Europe 
lambasted Spain for failing “to act in accordance with [its] search and rescue obligations.” 
(Martínez de Rituerto, 2012) 
Other Instances of Refoulement 
The inaction of the Spanish crew in the incident described above effectively resulted in the 
‘return’ of the migrant boat to Libya at the hands of the Mediterranean currents – an implicit 
case of what can be called willfully negligent refoulement to a territory where the lives of 
asylum seekers are jeopardized.  However, there are countless other deportation cases where 
the refoulement was more deliberate.  In an especially troubling case from September 2007, 
Laucling Sonko, a Senegalese asylum seeker living in Morocco, drowned while attempting to 
reach the Spanish enclave of Ceuta with three others by floating into Spanish waters on an 
inflatable mattress.  The four men were intercepted by the Guardia Civíl, brought aboard 
their vessel, transported out of Spanish territory into Moroccan waters, and made to jump 
into the sea after the patrol officers pierced their life jackets, resulting in Sonko’s death.  The 
United Nations Committee against Torture found the Guardia Civíl and the Spanish state 
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guilty of violating several articles of the Convention against Torture as well as the Ley de 
Extranjería, which stipulate that officials are responsible for the safety of intercepted persons 
and must ensure that such persons be afforded judicial protection and access to the asylum 
system.  (Statewatch, 2012) Returning the men to Moroccan waters and forcing them to jump 
into the sea without flotation devices precluded them from lodging official asylum claims 
and amounted to both refoulement into unsafe territory and cruel and inhumane treatment, 
ultimately resulting in loss of life. 
Asylum Policy Reforms 
In response to criticism, the Spanish government has taken steps to improve upon asylum 
procedures and conform to standards set by the CEAS.  Amendments to several laws in 2010 
expanded officially recognized grounds for protection from persecution to include sexual 
orientation and gender, bringing the legislation in line with the 1967 Protocol to the UN 
Convention.  (Amnesty International, 2011) Additionally, the Spanish government granted 
NGOs and other monitoring groups broadened access to migration detention centers, thereby 
increasing the transparency of reception and processing protocols.  However, these 
advancements were overshadowed by additional ‘reforms’ that increases the permitted 
maximum detention periods and prohibits asylum seekers from lodging claims at Spanish 
embassies abroad.  
III.  Analysis 
Subpar conditions in reception facilities, protracted determination procedures, inadequate 
provision of legal, health and social services, immediate and unlawful expulsions, the use of 
excessive force, and flagrant violations of the non-refoulement principle indicate a systematic 
pattern of abuse and disregard for the fundamental right to seek asylum.  This section will 
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explore some of the possible factors that contribute to the dire state of the Spanish asylum 
system.   
Insufficient Resources 
The on-going economic crisis has without question taken its toll on Spain – one of the EU 
Member States that is widely considered to be one of the hardest hit.  Since most sectors of 
the Spanish government and society at large were impacted by the crisis, it would be 
reasonable to surmise that it has also had an effect on the operational reality of the country’s 
reception facilities.  A lack of physical and financial resources, combined with Spain’s 
general unpreparedness to absorb changes in migration patterns, has likely contributed to 
some degree to the poor conditions in the overcrowded and unsanitary centers where asylum 
seekers await the decisions on their protection petitions.  However, while the conditions at 
reception centers and severely delayed processing times might arguably be caused in part by 
the widespread effects of the economic crisis, the blatant human rights abuses detailed in the 
sections above cannot be attributed to – nor excused by – any financial woes facing the 
Spanish asylum system.  Other factors must be explored.  
Relationship with Morocco 
Spain’s returns agreement with the Moroccan government allows Spanish border authorities 
to send back migrants upon determining that they entered Spanish territory from Morocco.  
However, asylum seekers subjected to returns to Morocco are placed at significant risk of ill 
treatment, further refoulement (to Algeria, for instance), torture, and death.  Additionally, 
though Morocco is a signatory to the UN Convention, the country has neither a formal 
asylum system policy scheme nor any legislation regarding the treatment of asylum seekers 
in place.  (Amnesty International, 2006)  Given these practices, Morocco is not considered to 
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be a safe third country and the Spanish authorities that refoule potential asylum seekers to 
Morocco do so without respecting the UN Convention or its own domestic asylum 
legislation. 
 Why, then, does Spain continue to violate proper asylum procedure during its border 
control operations with Morocco? Days after the deaths of the thirteen migrants at the 
Spanish/Moroccan borders at the enclaves, the Spanish government granted approval for 
sending 10.5 million euros in aid to Morocco in order to enhance border control measures 
near Ceuta and Melilla.  (Amnesty International, 2008)  This readmission agreement is based 
on the promise of international aid in return for cooperation on securing the borders and 
migration routes between the two countries using any means possible, without providing 
adequate assurances for the prevention of human rights abuses and compliance with 
international law.  The relationship between Spain and Morocco, which places a primacy on 
secure borders and allows abuses to go unpunished and poorly investigated, promotes a 
climate of impunity and places those who seek asylum in Spain at risk. 
Geopolitics 
Of the three country cases to be examined in this paper, Spain’s geopolitical position on the 
Mediterranean border is unique and notable.  As a signatory to the Schengen Agreement, the 
Spanish border is not only the entrance into Spain but also serves as a gateway into the entire 
EU.  As such, due to its particular geopolitical position as a EU border state and its status as a 
favored entry point for both asylum seekers and irregular migrants alike, Spain faces a 
particular kind of pressure to secure its border from illegal migration of any kind. As a result, 
there is a primacy placed on the protection of the border rather than the people who cross it, 
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and Spain’s capability (and perhaps willingness) to be a proper place of refuge for asylum 
seekers suffers for it.  
Xenophobia 
The failure of those aboard the Méndez Núñez to respond to the distress calls of the migrant 
boat in 2011 at its core reflects a general disregard for the lives of migrants.  The incident 
points to not only a complete lapse of moral judgment, but also to flagrant non-compliance 
with international humanitarian law. Tineke Strik, the Dutch author of the Council of 
Europe’s report lambasting Spain’s inaction and member of the committee on migration, 
refugees and displaced persons, touches on a probable root cause underlying this incident 
when he writes:  
"We can talk as much as we want about human rights and the importance of complying 
with international obligations, but if at the same time we just leave people to die – 
perhaps because we don't know their identity or because they come from Africa – it 
exposes how meaningless those words are…" (Shenker, 2012; emphasis added) 
 
Strik’s words are provocative and acknowledge that xenophobia is an underlying cause of 
this tragedy, placing at least part of the blame on the undercurrent of uneasiness and hostility 
that characterize the actions of Spain regarding the treatment of asylum seekers who flee 
from countries of origin deemed undesirable.   
Germany 
I.  Country Profile: 2005-2012 
Angela Merkel, the party leader of the center-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU), has 
held the position of the Chancellor of Germany (equivalent to the title of Prime Minister in 
other countries) since the 2005 elections.  For the period under examination, the head of 
government has remained under Christian Democratic control despite major changes in 
coalitions and regional party losses.  The CDU stresses the need for a tough stance on 
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immigration, favoring both integration policies for those already residing in the country and 
strict border control and vetting procedures for would-be immigrants to Germany.  (Evans, 
2010)   
 In Germany, the Federal Office for the Recognition of Foreign Refugees is the 
authoritative body that renders the decisions to grant asylum.  Upon initial submission of a 
petition, asylum seekers are placed in reception centers while their cases are preliminarily 
evaluated; the maximum stay in these centers is three months. (van Gelder, 2003) Individuals 
whose cases are approved for entry into the formal asylum determination process are 
transferred to longer-term accommodation centers.  The province in which the center is 
located is responsible for the allocation of funding, resulting in centers of varying quality. 
(van Gelder, 2003) Applicants are entitled to the services of an interpreter during any 
hearings or interviews that take place during the evaluations of their applications, but access 
to legal counsel tends to be limited to only the most destitute of asylum seekers. (van Gelder, 
2003) While awaiting decisions on their petitions, asylum seekers are prohibited from 
traveling around the country and are mandated to remain in the region in which they are 
registered; violation of this rule subjects an asylum seeker to fines, prison, or deportation.  
(Kriesch, 2012)  Asylum seekers were granted the right to work in Germany in 2001, 
provided that no German national or permanent resident can fill the job and that the asylum 
seeker has been in the country awaiting his or her decision for one year or more. (van Gelder, 
2003)  Special accelerated decision processes exist for airport arrivals without valid travel 
documents wherein the status of an application must be decided within two days; appeals to 
any negative decisions in such cases must be lodged within three days to avoid detention or 
deportation. (Gatwick Detainee Welfare Group, 2011) 
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II.  Treatment of Asylum Seekers in Germany 
Before the refugee crisis spawned by the Arab Spring, Germany tended to average around 
30,000 petitions for asylum per year.  In 2011, however, the country received just shy of 
45,000 applications.  The numbers for 2012 were even higher, closing in on 65,000 petitions, 
amounting to a 41 percent increase from the previous year.  (“Germany records big increase,” 
2013) Though these are among the higher averages in the EU, it is still much lower than 
Germany’s asylum load during the early nineties, when the country faced an annual average 
around 100,000 petitions.  (“Germany records big increase,” 2013) The available recognition 
rates as a proportion of total petitions received from 2006 through 2012 are presented below: 
Table 2. Recognition Rates in Germany 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Recognition Rate* 4.3% 25.1% 35.0% 36.5% 15.9% 17.6% 16.5%# 
*Positive decisions granting UN Convention Status as a percentage of total decisions. 
#Only data for the first Quarter of 2012 is presently available. Sources: UNCHR Statistical Yearbook, 2006-
2011; Bitoulas, 2012; Eurostat, 2012. 
 
Several domestic NGOs have called upon the government to admit more asylum seekers by 
increasing the number of positive decisions in proportion to the rise in petitions, citing the 
especially acute situation of asylum seekers (particularly those from North Africa and the 
Middle East) in recent years. (“Germany records big increase,” 2013) 
 This uptick in petitions has done no favors for the processing times and determination 
procedures.  Decisions are usually rendered after many months of uncertainty for the 
petitioner (who is often not kept informed of his or her status), but interviews with asylum 
seekers with pending applications have revealed processing times of over ten years, due to 
continual case deferrals.  (Taube, 2012) In addition to administrative backlogs and 
inefficiencies, asylum seekers in Germany are also at risk of various human rights abuses at 
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the hands of police, immigration authorities, and the system at large; the following sections 
will explore these realities.   
Instances of Ill-Treatment by Police 
The circumstances surrounding the following instances reveal several questionable practices 
of the German police and point to a climate of fear and a lack of sensitivity towards the 
vulnerability of asylum seekers in Germany.   On the morning of 7 January 2005, police 
detained Oury Jalloh, a documented asylum seeker from Sierra Leone, after he allegedly 
verbally harassed several women while under the influence of alcohol.  A doctor on staff at 
the Dessau police station recommended that Jollah be restrained so he would not injure 
himself in his inebriated state; two officers brought him down to a cell in the basement and 
tied him to a cot, securing him by his wrists and ankles, and returned upstairs.  (Unknown 
Assailant Amnesty International, 2010) Around noon, a fire alarm sounded from the 
basement, but an officer on duty turned it off, supposing a malfunction.  The officer made a 
phone call to his superior, searched for the keys for the wrist and ankle restraints, and sought 
out another officer to accompany him before heading downstairs to investigate.  By the time 
the two officers reached the cell, the fire and smoke had already spread throughout the cell.  
Ultimately, Jollah died from intense heat and smoke inhalation.  (Amnesty International, 
2010) 
 Though Jalloh’s death did not occur in a reception facility specifically designed to 
hold asylum seekers, the restraint methods used by the officers and their lackadaisical 
response to the situation are disturbing and relevant to understanding the nature of the 
treatment of asylum seekers in Germany.  By leaving an individual tied to a cot in the 
basement of the police station without supervision, the officers were in direct violation of 
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protocol that stipulates that an individual who is physically restrained must never be left 
unsupervised.  (Amnesty International, 2010) They also deliberately ignored signs of trouble 
by lowering the volume of the intercom to mask Jollah’s shouting and failing to react quickly 
after the fire alarm sounded.  This behavior, at the very least, shows a disregard for human 
life and suggests that the nature of the interaction between police and asylum seekers leaves 
much to be desired. 
     Ill-treatment of asylum seekers by police sometimes manifests in the form of 
intimidation as well as physical abuse, as demonstrated by the case of an asylum seeker from 
Chechnya identified in legal documents only as “A.”  On 16 February 2005, the owner of a 
small shop in Chemnitz called the police on suspicion that “A” was attempting to shoplift.  
According to statements made after the incident, responding officers, dressed in full riot 
uniforms and helmets, beat “A” to the floor with kicks and batons.  (Amnesty International, 
2010) After the assault and subsequent interrogation, the officers dropped him off on the road 
about 100 meters away from the asylum seeker reception center where he had been staying.  
“A” was immediately transferred to the hospital, where he remained for one week due to 
broken ribs and internal bleeding.  He declined to give any statements implicating the 
officers, citing that they “know where [he] live[s]” and feared repercussions; this fear likely 
stems from his prior imprisonment and torture in Chechnya, which made up the foundation 
of his claim to asylum in Germany, and an ensuing diagnosis of post traumatic stress 
disorder.  (Amnesty International, 2010) Without his or any other witness statement, the 
investigation into the assault was terminated.   
“Dublin Returns” to Greece 
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The Dublin II regulation, which tends to unfairly place a large burden on EU Member States 
due to their geographical position on the continent, has been lambasted as one of the most 
problematic elements of the CEAS.  In 2010, after finding significant variance in the way 
that asylum procedures are implemented across the EU, the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) issued orders to Member States to suspend Dublin returns to Greece, whose asylum 
system was found to be especially dysfunctional.  (Human Rights Watch, 2011)  Despite this, 
Germany transferred 55 asylum seekers to Greece in 2011.  (Amnesty International, 2012)  
Breaches of the Non-Refoulement Principle 
Failure to uphold the non-refoulement principle is one of Germany’s most consistent and 
egregious violations of CEAS and UN Convention standards.  Forced returns to Eritrea – 
where being a practicing member of certain banned religions, speaking out against the 
government, evading military service, and seeking asylum in other countries are considered 
criminal and often result in torture and indefinite incommunicado detentions – were of 
primary concern for the UNHCR, which had issued a statement strongly discouraging any 
returns of rejected asylum seekers to Eritrea, since the very act of seeking asylum jeopardizes 
the safety of an Eritrean national.  (Amnesty International, 2008)  Despite this 
recommendation, Germany continued deportations of rejected Eritrean asylum seekers to 
Eritrea.  In one instance in May 2008, German immigration officials forcibly deported two 
Eritrean nationals after the rejection of their asylum applications; neither man has been seen 
since the plane landed in Asmara, and it is likely that the men are being unlawfully detained 
and subjected to torture as punishment for what is perceived by the Eritrean government to 
be treason. (Amnesty International, 2008) 
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 Germany has also come under fire from the UNHCR and various NGOs for forced 
returns and refoulements to Iraq.  In 2007, Germany systematically began to withdraw 
previously approved protective status from Iraqis, which invalidated their residency permits 
and placed them at risk for deportation; this decision came in conjunction with a formal 
announcement from then-Interior Minister Wolfgang Schäuble that the Federal Agency for 
Migration and Refugees were permitted to issue deportation orders for asylum seekers to 
northern Iraq – a region of the country specifically identified as being notoriously unsafe.  
(Amnesty International, 2008)       
Response to Criticism 
Germany has been relatively receptive to criticism of its asylum system and the behavior of 
its immigration officials and has taken several steps toward improving the quality of 
protection provided, including the reconsideration of questionable returns practices.  In 2008, 
the German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees repealed its decision to forcibly 
return Eritrean national Mohamed Abdelrahman Ferah and granted him the opportunity to 
reapply for asylum without further risk of deportation.  (Amnesty International, 2008)  
Additionally, as of January 2012, Dublin returns to Greece have been suspended for a 
minimum period of one year.  (Amnesty International, 2012)  Germany forcibly returned a 
large number of Syrian asylum seekers after signing a readmission agreement with the Assad 
regime.  However, due to the ongoing political unrest in Syria, Germany recently placed a 
moratorium on this practice and began granting automatic subsidiary protective status (not 
Convention status) to Syrian asylum seekers.  (Human Rights Watch, 2012)  
 Germany has also recognized its failure to provide asylum seekers with adequate 
access to welfare.  Before 2012, the social benefits paid to asylum seekers and resettled 
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refugees (€224 per month; 47% lower than those received by citizens and permanent 
residents) had remained unchanged and unadjusted for inflation for nearly a decade.  
(“German court decision,” 2012)  In 2012, the Federal Constitutional Court ruled that these 
benefits do not “correspond to the fundamental right to a humane level of subsistence” and 
must be increased to match the benefits received by citizens, as asylum seekers are “equally 
entitled” to a dignified standard of living. (Spiegel, 2012) 
III.  Analysis 
Germany has acknowledged that its asylum procedures were falling short of acceptable 
standards.  Though this might suggest that the climate for asylum seekers might be shifting in 
a more positive direction, Germany still allows many worrisome practices to continue. Why 
do these practices persist when Germany has committed to making progress on the asylum 
issue? 
Media Coverage and Official Government Rhetoric  
A notable trend in the German media, which actually dates back to the inflammatory media 
coverage of resettled refugees in the 1990s, is the blanket portrayal of asylum seekers to 
Germany as ‘bogus.’  (Nickels, 2007)  A fair portion of the coverage conflates the issues of 
asylum with economic migration by suggesting that many asylum seekers to Germany are 
free riders, knowing their claims of well-founded fear are unjustified and only seek to take 
advantage of “free accommodation and some pocket money.”  (EurActiv, 2012) This 
generalized accusation likely perpetuates antagonism towards asylum seekers in the minds of 
media consumers.    
This sentiment is also blatantly echoed in the official rhetoric of members of the 
German government.  Recently, the Interior Minister Hans-Peter Friedrich railed against 
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economic migrants posing as asylum seekers in need of protection and vowed to “ensure that 
[the German] asylum system is not subject to abuse so that those who are genuinely 
vulnerable can find protection.”  (“Germany records big increase,” 2013) Though this implies 
humanitarian intentions, the widespread use of the terms ‘bogus’ or ‘fake’ to describe asylum 
seekers and the suggestion that many of these individuals are disingenuous in their claims is 
damaging and cultivates an environment of mistrust, speculation, and insensitivity. 
Racism and Xenophobia  
The portrayal of asylum seekers in the media has likely contributed in some way to the 
undeniable xenophobia expressed by both the government and the public.  Thomas Fabian, a 
local official in Leipzig and an advocate for the rights of asylum seekers, encountered this 
first-hand among his constituents when he attempted to garner support for an initiative to 
accommodate asylum seekers with pending applications in several rental properties.  Though 
the project was initially met with support, local residents began to voice emphatic opposition 
to the project when it became clear that their towns would be included in the implementation.  
Fabian stated that he was “quite shocked by the sometimes very strong prejudices expressed 
against asylum seekers and refugees” and acknowledged that the resistance and retraction of 
support stems from the general perception of asylum seekers as “synonymous with crime and 
social problems.”  (Kriesch, 2012)   
German authorities and members of government are not immune to displays of 
prejudice, discrimination and xenophobia.  After Oury Jalloh’s death, the doctor who 
recommended the use of restraints was (administratively) reprimanded for lamenting that he 
can “never find a vein with dark-skinned” after being informed by one of the officers that he 
would need to “prick a black African” for a blood test.  (Amnesty International, 2010) In 
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2009, then-Interior Minister Schäuble formally announced a new proposal that only asylum 
applications from Christian Iraqis would be considered in Germany’s new approach to 
handling the wave of protection petitions from Iraq.  (Amnesty International, 2010) This is 
supported by UN investigations that concluded persistent racism and widespread xenophobia 
negatively impact asylum seekers in Germany, especially regarding freedom of movement, 
access to employment and education, and standard of living.  (Human Rights Watch, 2011)  
Though xenophobia of any kind adds a troubling layer of complexity to the asylum issue in 
Germany, it is all the more damaging when individuals in a position of power and authority 
publically articulate such sentiments, and it sets a very low standard for the entire national 
asylum system. 
Denmark 
I.  Country Profile 
For the majority of the period of examination, the major center-right Venstre party held 
control of the Danish government under the Prime Ministries of Anders Fogh Rasmussen 
(2001-2009) and Lars Løkke Rasmussen (2009-2011).  Over its decade of leadership, 
Venstre formed a coalition government with the also right-of-center Conservative People's 
Party, and enjoyed vocal support from Pia Kjærsgaard’s populist Danish People’s party.  In 
2011, however, Denmark saw a major change in government when Helle Thorning-Schmidt, 
leader of the opposition Social Democratic party, was appointed Prime Minister, ousting the 
incumbent center-right coalition in favor of a center-left coalition in conjunction with the 
Socialist People’s party and the Social Liberal Party.  As in the Spanish case, it is likely too 
early to assess the long-term effects that this drastic change in leadership has had or will have 
on Danish asylum policy.  
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 The Danish asylum system is procedurally rather similar to those of other EU 
Member States.  An individual seeking asylum must present themselves to the police to lodge 
their claim; the office of the National Commissioner of the Police handles identification 
determination procedures in order to ensure that the claim in Denmark is not invalidated 
under the Dublin Regulation or any safe country policies.  (van Gelder, 2003)  An asylum 
seeker may only be detained for up to one week during the admissibility assessment, upon 
which time he or she will be transferred to an accommodation center if the claim is found to 
be valid.  All asylum seekers with pending applications are entitled to some social security 
benefits to cover food, clothing, and a small allowance.  According to the legislation, the 
reception centers must provide children with education in several basic subjects 
corresponding to their age and rough grade level, whereas adults are entitled to take classes 
to expand their professional skill set.  (van Gelder, 2003)  Interviews are conducted with the 
assistance of interpreters in order to elaborate on the circumstances under which the asylum 
seeker is claiming well-founded fear of persecution; decisions are meant to be rendered 
within three months, but can sometimes be deferred an additional ninety days. (van Gelder, 
2003)  If an application is rejected, deportation orders are immediately issued.  There is an 
appeals process available at every step of the application cycle. 
II.  Treatment of Asylum Seekers in Denmark 
Recent trends in asylum applications and decisions are preliminary indicators that something 
might be amiss within Denmark’s asylum system.  Recently, the UNHCR noted a 23 percent 
drop in total applications lodged in Denmark in 2011 compared to the figures for 2010.  
(Stanner, 2012) This drop in applications in Denmark occurred as the European Union 
cumulatively witnessed a 19 percent increase in applications; the Danish Refugee Council, 
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which is not a government body but rather an independent human rights watch group, 
attributed this mysterious and sudden drop to the perception that Denmark is “a difficult 
place to be granted asylum.” (Stanner, 2012) The recognition rates from 2006 through 2012 
are presented in the table below:  
Table 3. Recognition Rates in Denmark 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Recognition Rate* 12.3% 11.6% 20.5% 22.2% 18.5% 20.6% 17.8%# 
*Positive decisions granting UN Convention Status as a percentage of total decisions. 
#Only data for the first Quarter of 2012 is presently available. Sources: UNCHR Statistical Yearbook, 2006-
2011; Bitoulas, 2012; Eurostat, 2012. 
 
 
Though there is not enough data to establish a solid pattern, for the past five years, Denmark 
seems to grant UN Convention status to around 20 percent of the asylum applicants whose 
decisions are heard each year.  Within the context of the Danish asylum load, the percentages 
are not extremely encouraging, but they’re also certainly not low enough in comparison to 
other Member States’ proportionate recognition rates to warrant the perception that attaining 
protective status in Denmark is exceedingly difficult.  Denmark’s poor reputation as far as 
the asylum issue is concerned more likely stems from the practices outlined in the following 
sections.  
Forced Returns to Iraq 
By far the most worrisome practice of the Danish government is the refoulement of Iraqis.  
Since 2009, the number of pending Iraqi asylum cases in Denmark has dropped significantly, 
due in large part to the government’s deportation of asylum seekers whose claims for 
protection have been rejected.  (Wenande, 2012)  Denmark has consistently acted in defiance 
of guidelines and warnings issued by the UNHCR and human rights groups regarding forced 
returns to Iraq, including to provinces considered to be especially unsafe such as Mosul, Al 
Anbar, and Baghdad.  In 2009, eleven Iraqi nationals were forcibly returned (Amnesty 
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International, 2009); in 2011, Denmark deported sixty-two.  (Amnesty International, 2012)  
Information unearthed in a subsequent probe into Denmark’s infractions suggests that at least 
500 rejected asylum seekers have been refouled to Iraq since 2004, despite awareness of the 
likelihood of facing torture upon their returns. (Amnesty International, 2013) 
 Even the Iraqi government itself has expressed disapproval of Denmark’s systematic 
repatriation of rejected asylum seekers by refusing to admit returned applicants into the 
country upon their arrival at customs; officials have additionally threatened to levy massive 
fines against the airlines that partake in the returns as an added deterrent to the practice. 
(Wenande, 2012)  Iraq has also taken action by refusing to issue passports to Iraqi asylum 
seekers without travel documentation from the embassy in Copenhagen. 
Interaction between Authorities and Asylum Seekers 
The actions of Danish immigration officials and police toward asylum seekers are at best 
negligent and insensitive; at worst, they amount to callous and deliberate human rights 
abuses.  In one January 2009 incident, a squad Copenhagen riot police conducted a raid on a 
church that was a suspected refuge for asylum seekers who had been forced out of 
overcrowded reception centers after their decisions were deferred for upwards of ten years.  
The explicit intentions of this raid were to locate, detain, and deport seventeen previously 
rejected asylum seekers who were, coincidentally, Iraqi nationals.  (Amnesty International, 
2009) The conduct of these officers was an offensive display of insensitivity toward the 
asylum seekers in that the raid, which was carried out at night by police in full riot gear, was 
likely triggering for individuals who have previously been subjected to torture in their 
countries of origin.  During the raid, police used excessive force against the asylum seekers 
during their removal from the church, as well as against demonstrators who had gathered in 
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protest and were recording the violence on film. (Amnesty International, 2009) After their 
arrests, the asylum seekers were taken to a detention center, described by Amnesty 
International observers as prison-like, in Sandholm. 
Unreliable Commitments to Reform 
Denmark has failed to measure up to several commitments to change its approach to 
implementing asylum procedures.  Although the Danish government formally pledged to 
observe the absolute nature of the non-refoulement principle in 2011 – which would include 
halting forced returns to Iraq – deportations of Iraqi nationals continued in 2012, when at 
least 43 returns were carried out.  (Amnesty International, 2011)  Furthermore, despite 
assurances that detention of asylum seekers would only be used as a last resort, current 
Danish immigration law not only calls for the detention of asylum seekers while their 
applications are pending or after they have been rejected, but it also does not set a maximum 
permissible length of detention and thus leaves room for abuse.  (Amnesty International, 
2011)  The detention of the seventeen Iraqi nationals after the Copenhagen church raid 
suggests otherwise.   Denmark’s continual failure to honor its commitments casts a pall of 
unreliability over the word of its officials and suggests that any future commitments lack 
credibility and should be suspect to skepticism. 
III.  Analysis 
While the section above suggest that Denmark’s reputation as one of the EU Member States 
with the harshest asylum systems has been well earned, the following sections will identify 
some of the factors that contribute to and perpetuate the ill-treatment of asylum seekers.    
The Decision to “Opt-Out” 
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The most obvious factor contributing to the unsympathetic nature of the Danish asylum 
system is the fact that Denmark elected to “opt out” of all EU asylum laws during 
negotiations of the Maastricht Treaty and is not formally bound by any clauses relating to the 
CEAS.  Though this opt-out does not preclude Denmark from aligning some or all of its 
policies and practices, the government has specifically and continually refused to be a party 
to the CEAS and incorporate any of its harmonization initiatives into the domestic asylum 
policy scheme.  One of the most troubling consequences of this decision has been the explicit 
rejection of the Qualification Directive, which expands the criteria for a justified claim of 
well-founded fear to include persecution on the grounds of gender identity or sexuality and 
provides guidelines for ensuring the treatment of unaccompanied minors. (European Council 
on Refugees and Exiles, 2012) By specifically electing to reject this particular directive, 
Denmark willfully creates an asylum environment that is hostile to the protection needs of 
women, individuals identifying as LGBTQ, and children.3 Denmark’s qualification criteria 
have also been identified as following an “unduly restrictive interpretation of the 1951 
Refugee Convention,” to which it is a signatory.  (Amnesty International, 2009)  Denmark 
has clearly placed primacy on the maintenance of its national sovereignty over its asylum 
system, rather than on the quality of that system; that this is extremely problematic in the 
quest for harmonization of asylum policy and ensuring the commitment to offering protection 
from persecution across the EU is self-explanatory.  
Xenophobia and the Radical Right 
                                                
3 Recently, Denmark has expressed some willingness to consider incorporating some of the standards on reception 
conditions (perhaps due to the change in government) but has maintained steadfast opposition to reforming its interpretation 
of qualification criteria.  (Stanners, 2012)  
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Perhaps this “opt-out” from the directives stipulating the adherence to basic minimum 
standards to guarantee the protection of asylum seekers in the EU is unsurprising when 
considering Danish party politics.  As mentioned previously, the leaders of the Venstre party, 
the most prominent Danish party of the center-right, occupied the position of Prime Minister 
for the majority of the period covered in this analysis.  During its decade at the helm of the 
Danish government, Venstre was lent significant support from the right wing, populist – and 
decidedly anti-immigrant and xenophobic – Danish People’s Party (DF).  This gesture of 
support did not come without a price, as the DF made its continued backing of Venstre 
contingent upon the adoption of anti-immigrant policies at the national level. (Dencker and 
Ramser, 2011)  Several laws were pushed through to approval by the close cooperation 
between the parties in the early 2000s, including mechanisms facilitating the rejection and 
deportation of asylum seekers.  (Danish Aliens Consolidation Act, 2006)  The strong 
leverage held by such a hard-line anti-immigrant party over the Danish government for a 
decade undoubtedly played a key role in the tightening of the country’s ever-restrictive and 
abusive asylum policies and procedures.   
 Though reviled by some, the DF enjoyed enthusiastic support from many Danes and 
grew to be the third largest political party in the country. (Dencker and Ramser, 2011) By 
pandering to an uneasy public with appeals to the preservation of “Danish values,” 
complicity in the spread of Islamophobic propaganda (most notoriously in the form of 
cartoons satirizing the Muslim prophet Muhammad), and launching successful campaigns to 
block the construction of mosques and Muslim cemeteries, the DF was able to increase its 
applications to its membership registery seventeenfold.  (Day, 2006) Furthermore, its 
constituency shifted from predominantly working class voters to include the young and the 
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educated. (Demir and Altinas, 2012) Considering its wide reach, it is unsurprising that these 
xenophobic sentiments have trickled down to the general public, creating a hostile 
environment for asylum seekers in Denmark at every societal level. 
DISCUSSION 
The treatment conditions across the various Member States are only disparate in the sense 
that some national asylum systems are less broken than others.  None of the cases in this 
study stands out as an exemplary model, and the overall quality of care and protection 
offered leaves much to be desired and requires immediate attention.   
It is important to note that, with the obvious exception of Denmark, the asylum 
legislation of the other country cases do in fact align with CEAS mandates.  The problem is 
not that the asylum policy schemes of the Member States diverge so greatly from the 
standards of protection outlined in the CEAS and international human rights law, but rather 
that the implementation and enforcement of these standards and protocols fails on the 
national and supranational levels.  Multiple national context factors, both domestic and 
external, do appear to be convalescing in such a way that has rendered the CEAS rather 
impotent.  Though its capacity for generalization to the entire EU is limited, the analysis 
points to several factors that contribute to the failure of the CEAS to progress in a meaningful 
way and opens up several avenues for further scholastic exploration. 
The relationship between Spain and Morocco points to the long-standing tendency for 
European governments to factor in trading partnerships, border control concerns, and even 
colonial ties when developing and enforcing asylum and immigration policies that dates back 
to the ‘safe country’ policies of the nineties.  Spain’s engagement in an explicit bilateral deal 
to curb migration with a refugee-sending nation like Morocco that so blatantly disregards 
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human rights is an obvious signal that national and foreign policy interests have a negative 
impact on asylum policy.  However, due to governmental inefficiency and geographic 
proximity to many refugee-producing regions, the relatively young Spanish asylum system is 
underfinanced and overburdened, making asylum procedures geared toward deterrence in 
Spain’s interest; in this case, geopolitics combined with the Dublin Regulation exacerbates 
an already broken national asylum system.  It would be worth exploring if geopolitics and 
bilateral immigration agreements hold similar explanatory power in other EU Member States. 
A common thread among the three countries examined in this study is the detrimental 
effect of pervasive xenophobic sentiments.  The willingness on the parts of the media and the 
government to make and perpetuate xenophobic or racist remarks – most fiercely expressed 
in Denmark but also present in Germany and Spain – reflects widespread antagonism 
towards asylum seekers at all societal levels and makes the subpar quality of asylum schemes 
in these nations unsurprising.  It is imperative to assess the extent to which this factor might 
be operating within other Member States’ national contexts, as the subsequent policy 
recommendations would be much more complicated than administrative or financial reform 
and would have to target attitudes. 
Denmark’s refusal to align its national asylum policy to the standards and oversight 
mechanisms provided by the CEAS is an extreme but illustrative example of the damaging 
effect that jealously guarded national sovereignty has had on harmonization efforts.  Though 
most EU Member States have not taken such a radical stance (only the United Kingdom and 
Ireland have also opted out of parts of the CEAS), the unwillingness of national governments 
to transfer competency and sovereignty to the EU level poses a challenge to the 
implementation of the CEAS: how can a European asylum system be “common” when 
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Member States are completely sovereign over their domestic asylum policies, and in some 
cases are even granted permission to opt out of the entire initiative? So long as Member 
States retain full sovereignty over their domestic asylum systems, efforts to harmonize will 
remain stalled and the EU’s normative orientation as a place of refuge for asylum seekers 
will remain, to some extent, largely hollow. 
The clash over sovereignty leads to a final point: that poor enforcement at the EU 
level has as much to do with the unsuccessful implementation of the CEAS as do the strong 
national interests of its Member States.  The response of the EU to the crises in the Middle 
East and North Africa over the past several years has been almost exclusively to secure and 
militarize its land and sea borders, and since the nineties it has prioritized taking a 
securitarian stance on migration and asylum policy rather than a humanitarian one.  
(Amnesty International, 2005; Boswell, 2003)  This tension between migration control and 
asylum policy exposes the inability (or unwillingness) of the EU to reconcile its rhetoric with 
its actions and severely discredits its legitimacy as a global promoter of human rights.   
The CEAS, despite the completion of two phases spanning nearly fourteen years, has 
failed to overcome the legacy of the nineties, when asylum policy was focused on the 
deterrence and prevention of asylum seekers entering the EU rather than the human rights 
abuses they endure at the hands of their persecutors and the EU itself.  So long as the 
political willingness to change the status quo remains absent at the national and supranational 
levels, asylum seekers will continue to be denied the protection guaranteed to them under 
international humanitarian law.  The Member States’ obstinacy in their refusal to place 
primacy on the human right to seek asylum in favor of preserving their national interests and 
the impotency of the EU to harmonize asylum policy along an acceptable minimum standard 
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of protection will prove to be a fatal combination for the successful future of the CEAS – at a 
terrible human cost. 
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